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TAKE ME TO YOUR LITER: POLITICS, POWER AND
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE SUGARSWEETENED BEVERAGE INDUSTRY IN THE POST-2015
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
Craig W. Moscetti† & Allyn L. Taylor†
Abstract: Today, non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”) are widely recognized as
a global public health crisis and a foreign policy priority. The international community
was slow to identify and respond to the crisis of NCDs in the later part of the twentieth
century. However, in 2011 the United Nations High Level Meeting on NCDs recognized
NCDs as one of the greatest threats to health and development in the twenty-first century,
and a major topic for the post-2015 development agenda. Notably, many experts,
national governments, and global leaders have rallied for an inclusive, “whole-ofgovernment” and “whole-of-society” approach, situating public-private partnerships
(“PPPs”) with some of the vectors of NCDs, in particular the food and beverage
industries, as the necessary strategy to address the issue.
Although PPPs in global health are not a new phenomenon, PPPs with the food and
beverage industries require a greater level of scrutiny and caution. The same level of
vigilance should be applied when considering partnerships with the sugar-sweetened
beverage (SSB) industry, as in the tobacco and firearms industries, which produce goods
known to be antithetical to public health. We examine how major SSB companies, such
as the Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo, have been viewed as legitimate actors and
partners, despite employing coercive tactics similar to the tobacco industry. We question
their assumed full participation and cooperation in global NCD initiatives and call for
greater transparency in global NCD partnership development and policy dialogue,
particularly in the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”) are a global public health
crisis. The 2011 United Nations High Level Meeting on NCDs recognized
NCDs as a critical threat to health and development in the twenty-first
century. 1 NCDs—heart disease, diabetes, cancer, and chronic lung
†
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would like to thank Professor Taylor for her encouragement to pursue this project and invaluable insights to
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Professor of international relations at the John Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies.
1
U.N. General Assembly, Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly
on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases; Draft resolution submitted by the President
of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/L.1 (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/vi
ew_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/L.1 [hereinafter Political Declaration].
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disease—and their shared modifiable risk factors—unhealthy diets, physical
inactivity, alcohol abuse and tobacco use—caused almost 70 percent of the
world’s 56 million deaths in 2012; roughly six times as many deaths as
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis combined.2 Nearly three-quarters of
these, and most premature deaths, occur in low- and middle-income
countries. Moreover, the burden of disease is expected to grow over the
coming decades and will represent some 70 percent of global deaths in
2030.3
Risk factors associated with NCDs are also on the rise in many lowand middle-income countries. A “nutrition transition” has been well
documented globally, with more populations consuming larger amounts of
sugar, animal meat, and vegetable oils. 4 Diets are also becoming
increasingly energy-dense, with declining quality because of greater
consumption of unhealthy foods, such as sugar-sweetened beverages
(“SSBs”).5 For example, in the United States, SSBs are the primary source
of added sugar.6 They also accounted for at least one-fifth of the weight
gain in the US population between 1977 and 2007. 7 SSB consumption
impairs glucose and lipid metabolism, increases inflammation, and
significantly increases the risk of obesity, type 2 diabetes, and other chronic
diseases.8 As such, SSB consumption accelerates cellular aging and shortens
life, with every eight-ounce serving of SSB consumed each day being
equivalent to about 1.9 additional years of aging. 9 Connections between

2

Global Status Report on Noncommunicable Diseases 2014: Attaining the nine global
noncommunicable diseases targets; a shared responsibility, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 9 (2014),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/148114/1/9789241564854_eng.pdf?ua=1.
3
Colin D. Mathers & Dejan Loncar,. Projections of Global Mortality and Burden of Disease from
2002 to 2030, 3 PLOS MED. 2011, 2020-21 (2006).
4
See Barry M Popkin, Global nutrition dynamics: the world is shifting rapidly toward a diet linked
with noncommunicable disease, 84(2) AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 289 (2006).
5
See Fumiaki Imamura, Dietary quality among men and women in 187 countries in 1990 and 2010:
a systematic assessment, 3 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH, e132, 2015, at 2.
6
See Accelerating Progress in Obesity Prevention, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADEMIES
(May 2012),
http://
www.iom.edu/Reports/2012/Accelerating-Progressin-ObesityPrevention/~/media/Files/Report%20 Files/2012/APOP/IOM_FoodDrink_brief_v4.pdf.
7
See Cynthia L. Ogden & Margaret D. Carroll et al., Prevalence of High Body Mass Index in US
Children and Adolescents, 2007-2008, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 242 (2010).
8
See Frank B. Hu & Vasanti S. Malik, Sugar-sweetened beverages and risk of obesity and type 2
diabetes: Epidemiological evidence, 100 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 47 (2010); Isabelle Aeberli et al., Low to
moderate sugar-sweetened beverage consumption impairs glucose and lipid metabolism and promotes
inflammation in healthy young men: a randomized controlled trial, 94 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 479
(2012).
9
See Cindy W. Leung et al., Soda and cell aging: associations between sugar-sweetened beverage
consumption and leukocyte telomere length in healthy adults from the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Surveys, 104(12) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2425 (2014).
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SSB consumption and weight gain have been found for both adult and
adolescent populations.10
Globally, one in three people are overweight or obese, increasing by
1.3 billion people between 1980 and 2013.11 More than 60 percent of the
world’s obese people live in developing countries, with 15 percent of the
world’s obese people living in China and India alone. 12 Projections also
estimate the prevalence of type 2 diabetes will increase 170 percent in
developing countries and 42 percent in developed countries between 1995
and 2025, affecting an estimated 438 million individuals by 2030.13
The economic costs of the increasing NCD epidemic are
unprecedented. Collectively, NCDs are predicted to cost the global
economy USD 47 trillion over the coming two decades.14 By 2030, diabetes
will require USD 490 billion in health care expenditures globally. 15 Obesity
is also taking a toll on economies and health systems. Currently, obesity’s
impact on global gross domestic product (“GDP”) amounts to USD 2.0
trillion. 16 For many countries, this impact is projected to increase. For
example, in the United States and United Kingdom, obesity-related medical
costs are estimated to increase by USD 48–66 billion per year and by GBP
1.9–2 billion per year respectively by 2030.17
Like many other global health challenges, effectively combatting
NCDs cannot be addressed by the health sector alone, but rather requires
multi-sectoral action. One’s risk of developing cancer or heart disease, for
example, are influenced by a multitude of factors controlled by any number
of different sectors including: trade, agriculture, urban planning,
environment, and financial policy.18 As a result, many experts, government
10
See Vasanti Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, Obesity, Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus, and
Cardiovascular Disease Risk, 121 CIRCULATION J. 1356 (2010).
11
See Marie Ng et al., Global, regional, and national prevalence of overweight and obesity in
children and adults during 1980–2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013,
384 THE LANCET 766 (2014).
12
See id.
13
See Hilary King et al., Global burden of diabetes, 1995-2025: prevalence, numerical estimates,
and projections, 21 DIABETES CARE 1414 (1998); Frank B. Hu, Globalization of diabetes: the role of diet,
lifestyle, and genes, 34(6) DIABETES CARE 1249 (2011).
14
David E. Bloom et al., The Global Economic Burden of Non-communicable Diseases, WORLD
ECON. FORUM 6 (Sept. 2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18806en/s18806en.pdf.
15
Ping Zhang et al., Global healthcare expenditure on diabetes for 2010 and 2030, 87 DIABETES
RES. & CLINICAL PRAC. 294, 294 (2010).
16
Richard Dobbs et al., How the world could better fight obesity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Nov.
2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/how_the_world_could_better_fight_obesity.
17
Y Claire Wang et al., Health and economic burden of the projected obesity trends in the USA and
the UK, 378 THE LANCET 815, 815 (2011).
18
Kumanan Rasanathan & Rüdiger Krech, Action on the social determinants of health is essential to
tackle noncommunicable diseases, BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/10/11-094243/en/.
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officials, and global leaders have rallied for an inclusive “whole-ofgovernment” and “whole-of-society” approach. Such an approach would
situate public-private partnerships (“PPPs”), including those with the food
and beverage industries, as core and perhaps necessary vehicles to address
NCDs.19 Some stakeholders from governments, international organizations,
or public health organizations see these industries as possessing valuable
resources (e.g., financial, human, technical, influential) that can be harnessed
to improve health.20
At the same time, business as a whole has a vested interest in NCDs.
The profit and growth of some businesses, such as in the food and beverage
industries that produce unhealthy food products, help encourage
consumption of these products, increasing NCD risk. 21 Further, with the
economic development and population growth in Asia, Latin America, the
Middle East, and Africa, companies see these regions as the most viable for
increasing profit margins. These are also the same regions that are projected
to experience the largest increase in NCD burden in the coming decades.22
However, this growth for companies is directly tied to the health and
productivity of its workforce.23 NCDs and obesity pose significant threats to
business, projected to cost the global economy trillions of dollars in the
coming decades.24 These potential barriers to economic growth are of great
concern for business.
Although PPPs in global health are not a new phenomenon,
partnerships with the food and beverage industries require a greater level of
scrutiny than currently received. PPPs with industries such as tobacco and
firearms, which manufacture products known to be antithetical to public
health, 25 have been widely rejected. 26 However, opinions regarding the
appropriate role of food and beverage companies are mixed, including for
the two largest non-alcoholic multinational beverage companies—The Coca19

See Political Declaration, supra note 1.
Global Forum: Addressing the Challenges of Noncommunicable Diseases: Forum Report, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.who.int/nmh/events/global_forum_ncd/en/.
21
See David Stuckler et al., Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in Increased
Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol, and Tobacco, 9 PLOS MED.,
e10011235, 2012.
22
See Global Status report on noncommunicable diseases 2010, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 2011),
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240686458_eng.pdf?ua=1.
23
See Christine Hancock et al., The private sector, international development and NCDs, 7(23)
Globalization & Health 1 (2011).
24
See Dobbs, supra note 16; Bloom, supra note 14.
25
See H. Kuper et al., Tobacco use and cancer causation: association by tumour type, 252 J.
INTERNAL MED. 206 (2002).
26
See Paul A. Simon & Jonathan E. Fielding, Public Health And Business: A Partnership That
Makes Cents, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1029 (2006).
20
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Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”) and PepsiCo. Coca-Cola is the largest nonalcoholic beverage company in the world, operating in more than 200
countries and controlling 42 percent of the global SSB market.27 PepsiCo,
which also sells unhealthy food products such as potato chips which
comprise roughly half of its sales, controls an additional 30 percent of the
global SSB market. 28 While PepsiCo attempts to introduce new product
lines marketed as healthier alternatives, such as Chobani Yogurt and Naked
Juice smoothies, 75 percent of global sales for Coca-Cola remain in SSBs.29
Openness to engagement and partnership with these companies
persists despite the growing evidence base that supports the link between
SSB consumption and chronic conditions detrimental to health, such as
obesity, metabolic syndrome, and type 2 diabetes.30 On the other hand, some
food companies, have played roles in various initiatives and partnerships to
help address global hunger, contributing to their perceived legitimacy in
international development. 31 As a result, partnerships that include these
companies have received less scrutiny compared to the tobacco industry
despite the global health impact of their products and the fact that these
companies employ similar tactics to influence research, public opinion, and
policy.
Consideration of the role of PPPs with food and beverage companies
is currently playing out within the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and
as part of a broader debate on the post-2015 development agenda.32 United
Nations Member States are in the process of determining Sustainable
Development Goals, which will succeed the expiring Millennium
Development Goals. After a global consultation, 33 a report by an
independent high-level panel of eminent persons appointed by the Secretary
General, 34 and an Open Working Group process, Member States will
consider a set of seventeen SDGs in September at the 68th UN General
27
Coke Vs. Pepsi: By The Numbers, NASDAQ (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/cokevs-pepsi-by-the-numbers-cm337909.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Risk of Metabolic Syndrome and
Type 2 Diabetes: A meta-analysis, 33 DIABETES CARE 2477 (2010).
31
See Nutrition for Growth Commitments: Executive Summary, NUTRITION FOR GROWTH,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207274/nutrition-forgrowth-commitments.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015).
32
See WHO Global Coordination Mechanism Working Groups, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/global-coordination-mechanism/working-groups/en/ (last visited May 16, 2015).
33
See THE WORLD WE WANT 2015, http://www.worldwewant2015.org (last visited May 16, 2015).
34
See A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustain
Development: The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 development
Agenda (May 30, 2013), http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf.
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Assembly. A variety of non-State actors, including businesses, have
weighed in on the proposal.35 A number of goals within the proposed SDGs
relate to NCDs, including Goal 2 focused on nutrition, Goal 3 to ensure
healthy lives and promote well-being, and Goal 12 to ensure sustainable
consumption and production patterns. Lastly, Goal 17, like the MDGs, calls
for partnership to “strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the
global partnership for sustainable development.”36
As the post-2015 development agenda solidifies, partnerships will be
a prominent strategy for governments, international organizations, and civil
society to achieve the SDGs. As stated by UN Secretary General Ban KiMoon during the release of his synthesis report on the post-2015 agenda,
partnerships are an “essential element” for success, and further, the agenda
“will be built on a foundation of global cooperation and solidarity.” 37
With partnerships occupying such a prominent position within the
post-2015 development agenda, the actors involved in them and the
processes by which they emerge should be carefully considered. Such
partnerships, especially those involving the private sector, require judicious
scrutiny and transparency of the actors involved and their interests to
safeguard public interests. More importantly, partnerships with industries
whose products are detrimental to health, such as some of those produced by
the food and beverage industry, require a more cautious approach to ensure
the integrity of global NCD policymaking and governance.
In this paper we discuss the evolution of the private sector in global
health PPPs. We then turn to examine current approaches within the UN
system, including through the WHO with regard to engaging with the private
sector. This examination is followed by a detailed exploration of two case
studies, the NCD Roundtable—convened by the Global Health Council—
and the Pan American Forum for Action on NCDs—convened by the Pan
American Health Organization. These case studies highlight various
coercive tactics employed by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, which are later
discussed in a cautionary questioning and call for reconsideration of the
current enthusiasm for PPPs at the WHO and the UN in the SDG agenda.
35

See U.N. Global Compact, The Role of Business and Finance in Supporting the Post-2015 Agenda
(July 2, 2014), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.6/Post2015_WhitePaper_2July14.pd
f.
36
See U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable
Development Goals (Jan. 22, 2013), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html [hereinafter
Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Development Goals]; We End Poverty: Millennium
Development Goals and Beyond 2015 (2015), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml.
37
See U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General remarks to the General Assembly on the Synthesis
Report on the Post-2015 Agenda (Dec. 4, 2014), www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8250.
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EVOLUTION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL
HEALTH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Public-private partnerships combine the unique assets from public and
private actors to jointly address complex challenges that one sector cannot
address alone. At the global level, PPPs can be defined as “a collaborative
relationship that transcends national boundaries and brings together at least
two parties, among them a corporation (and/or industry association) and an
intergovernmental organization, so as to achieve a shared health-creating
goal on the basis of a mutually agreed division of labor.”38 In doing so, each
individual partner brings a unique set of interests to bear, some of which are
overtly disclosed, while others are not.
Despite their popularity for addressing global development challenges
the history of PPPs is short, their definition is inconsistent, and evidence to
support them is weak.39 Prior to the late 1970s, relationships between public
and private entities were filled with mistrust, precluding both from engaging
in any meaningful collaboration within the UN system. 40 Partnerships in
international development were mostly between donors and recipient
country governments.41 A significant ideological shift took place during the
1980s and 1990s, marked by views that public and private sector
collaboration was needed to “modify” inefficient markets for public good.42
Motivated by disillusionment with the pace of the UN and multilateral
approaches generally, and the appeal of the private sector’s agility and
efficiency, PPPs became an attractive option to “get things done” by the
early 1990s.43 Although the global health community was slow to accept the
private sector as a legitimate partner, the popularity of PPPs in global health
rose steadily from the 1980s into the 2000s, catalyzed by the successful
Mectizan Donation Program of the 1980s.44 The success of this partnership
38

Kent Buse, Global Public–Private Partnerships for Health: Part I – A New Development in
Health?, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 549, 550 (2000).
39
See
Public-Private
Partnerships
in
developing
countries,
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN AFF. OF THE NETHERLANDS (2013), http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/IOBstudy378publicpriva
tepartnershipsindevelopingcountries.pdf [hereinafter Public-Private Partnerships].
40
Buse, supra note 38, at 551.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See id.
44
A PPP between the pharmaceutical company, Merck, and Latin American and Africa governments,
this partnership leveraged the production capacity of Merck to supply needed medications to treat
onchocerciasis, also known as river blindness, which currently infects about 37 million people, 99% of who
live in sub-Saharan Africa. Since it began, treatment donations exceed $1 billion for some 117,000
communities in 28 countries. See David H. Peters & Traci Phillips, Mectizan Donation Program:
evaluation of a public-private partnership, 9 TROPICAL MED. & INT’L HEALTH A4 (2004); Peter J. Hotez &
Aruna Kamath, Neglected Tropical Diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review of Their Prevalence,
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helped calm some previously held suspicions of forming partnerships with
industry, and launched a wave of new global health PPPs between 1982 and
2003. Many of these PPPs were with pharmaceutical and medical device
companies, who emerged as the first logical partners to advance global
health. These PPPs emerged at the same time as public health threats, such
as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, inundated developing country
governments. This presented a growing need for financial resources, new
drugs and medical technologies, and more extensive distribution and
delivery networks to facilitate access to life-saving treatments. As a result, a
growing consensus developed that partnerships with the private sector were
not only important, but also essential in a world of increasing
interdependence.45
The 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration—which formed the
backdrop for the Millennium Development Goals—and the United Nations
General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in 2001—the first-ever
high-level meeting devoted exclusively to a health topic—catalyzed and
propelled PPPs into the mainstream in global health. 46 States resolved to
“develop strong partnerships with the private sector” as part of the
Millennium Declaration, and partnerships emerged as one of eight explicit
MDGs, with a significant focus on cooperation with pharmaceutical
companies to expand access to affordable essential drugs in developing
countries.47 A similar emphasis continued with global approaches to address
HIV/AIDS in the Declaration of Commitment, including a commitment by
Member States to “foster stronger collaboration and the development of
innovative partnerships between the public and private sectors.” 48 The
Declaration went further to “establish and strengthen” decision-making
mechanisms “that involve the private sector and civil society partners.” 49
Alongside the Millennium Declaration, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

Distribution, and Disease Burden, 3 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES e412 (2009); B. Colatrella, The
Mectizan Donation Program: 20 years of successful collaboration – a retrospective, 102ANNALS OF
TROPICAL MED. & PARASITOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT ISSUE 1) 7 (2008).
45
See Kent Buse & Andrew Harmer, Power to the Partners? The Politics of Public-Private Health
Partnership, 47 DEV. 49 (2004); Judith Richter, Public-private Partnerships for Health: A Trend with no
Alternatives?, 47 DEV. 43 (2004).
46
See U.N General Assembly, Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS: United Nations Special
Session on HIV/AIDS (June 25, 2001), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/sub_landing/files/aidsdecl
aration_en_0.pdf [hereinafter Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS].
47
See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18,
2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf.
48
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, supra note 46, at 18.
49
Id.
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also established the United Nations Global Compact in 2000, a business
alliance that partners with the UN and UN specialized agencies.50
Though the private sector was not directly involved in their
governance, public international organizations, such as the United Nations
Joint Programme on AIDS (“UNAIDS”) and the WHO, strengthened their
engagement with the private sector in the 2000s, and developed explicit
guidelines to inform these partnerships.51 Many of the new global health
PPPs, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(“GFATM”), Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (“GAIN”), and the
Gavi Alliance (“GAVI”) include the private sector in some capacity on their
governing boards.52 Previous analyses of these types of global health PPPs
established evidence of their beneficial contributions, both in terms of
stakeholder participation and impact. 53 These results have supported an
increasing shift in financing global development, with roughly one-third of
official development assistance now flowing through global and regional
PPPs.54
GLOBAL HEALTH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
BEVERAGE CORPORATIONS

II.

WITH

FOOD

AND

Global PPPs created to address NCDs have attracted considerable
attention and scrutiny, particularly surrounding the role of companies whose
products contribute to ill health. The global health community widely
agrees on the necessity to closely regulate the tobacco industry and exclude
it from any health PPPs. 55 the WHO policy explicitly prohibits the
organization from accepting funding from the tobacco industry. Further, in
2003 Member States adopted the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (“FCTC”), one of the most widely ratified treaties in UN history and
50

See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited May 16,

2015).
51

See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS Guidelines: Working in Partnership
with the Private Sector (Aug. 2007), http://data.unaids.org/pub/Manual/2007/unaids_guidelines_august200
7_draft4_en.pdf.
52
See Keith Bezanson & Paul Isenman, Governance of New Global Partnerships: Challenges,
Weaknesses, and Lessons, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. (Oct. 2012), http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426627_file_
Bezanson_Isenman_FINAL.pdf.
53
See Global Health Partnerships: Assessing Country Consequences, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2005),
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/gf16.pdf; Kent Buse & Sonja Tanaka, Global Public-Private Health
Partnerships: Lessons learned from ten years of experience and evaluation, 61 INT’L DENTAL J. 2
(SUPPLEMENT ISSUE 2) (2011).
54
See Uma Lele et al., The Changing Aid Architecture: Can Global Initiatives Eradicate Poverty?,
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dac/37034781.pdf.
55
See Anna B. Gilmore et al., Public health, corporations and the New Responsibility Deal:
promoting partnerships with vectors of disease?, 33 J. PUB. HEALTH 2 (2011).
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the first convention established under the auspices of the WHO.56 The UN,
the WHO, and other public health authorities have widely affirmed the
position that tobacco companies can never be suitable partners. As the
WHO Director-General Margaret Chan emphatically reinforced at the 66 th
World Health Assembly, “the WHO will never be on speaking terms with the
tobacco industry.” 57 Thus, there is a clear conflict of interest for
governments and health organization to partner with the tobacco industry.
The role that the food and beverage industries should play in global
PPPs and policymaking lacks consensus. Food and beverage companies
have a history of some positive contributions to global health, particularly in
the areas of micronutrient fortification to address malnutrition. 58 More
recently, companies such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have involved
themselves in a broad range of development initiatives and partnerships,
contributing valuable resources to address food insecurity and clean water,
for example. 59 These contributions come at a time of stagnant donor
resources, such as from the United States Government.60
Industry executives claim they are simply trying to leverage their
scale for social good, as Muhtar Kent, CEO and Chairman of the Board of
Coca-Cola argued in a recent interview.61 Indra Nooyi, CEO of PepsiCo,
has made similar comments: “Large companies are powerful—they can play
a big role—so we need to work with governments to provide solutions.”62

56

See Ruth Roemer et al., Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 95 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 936 (2005).
57
Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General addresses the Sixty-sixth World Health Assembly, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (May 20, 2013), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2013/world_health_assembly_20130520/e
n/.
58
See Kraisid Tontisirin et al., Food-Based Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Micronutrient
Malnutrition in the Developing World, 61 PROC. NUTRITION SOC’Y 243 (2002).
59
For example, in 2011 PepsiCo established a partnership with the World Food Program, United
States Agency for International Development and the government of Ethiopia, called “Enterprise
EthioPEA,” to improve the productivity of Ethiopian chickpea farmers and connect these farmers to
PepsiCo’s global supply chain. The Coca-Cola Foundation’s flagship initiative, the Replenish Africa
Initiative (RAIN), is a six-year, $30 million commitment to improve access to clean water for 2 million
people in Africa by 2015. According to the company’s website, the initiative supported access to clean
water for 800,000 people as of 2014, less than half of its 2015 goal, and access to sanitation for 130,000
people.
60
See Adam Wexler & Jennifer Kates, The U.S Global Health Budget: Analysis of the Fiscal Year
2015 Budget Request, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 20, 2014), http://kff.org/globalhealth-policy/issue-brief/the-u-s-global-health-budget-analysis-of-the-fiscal-year-2015-budget-request/.
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YORKER (May 16, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/snacks-for-a-fat-planet.
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Countless other food industry executives have voiced similar sentiments,
such as Unilever CEO Paul Polman.63
The global health and international development communities have
been quick to accept the recent socially-conscious sentiments of many major
food and beverage companies, despite the unintended consequence of
legitimizing them in the process. A recent example is Coca-Cola’s strategic
partnership with the GFATM, announced in 2010, to improve the
distribution of medical supplies across Ethiopia. 64 Two years later, the
GFATM announced an expanded partnership with Coca-Cola to deliver
medicines to remote parts of the world as part of the “Project Last Mile.”65
Similarly, PepsiCo and the Clinton Foundation launched a strategic
partnership in 2014 to source cashew fruit from smallholder farmers in India
which will in turn create a new ingredient supply for PepsiCo products.66
Also, companies such as PepsiCo, Unilever and Yum! Brands all partner
with the World Food Program, the United Nation system’s lead agency on
fighting hunger worldwide.67
Food and beverage companies have also banded together to form
partnerships and make voluntary commitments to improve their products and
public health. The International Food and Beverage Alliance (“IFBA”)68 and
the Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation 69 are two examples of such
collaborations, and include many of the largest food and beverage
companies, including Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. Members of these groups
have pledged to reformulate their products to make them healthier, to
improve product nutrition information for consumers, and to restrict
63
Lawrence MacDonald, The Surprising and Sensible Remarks of Unilever CEO Paul Polman, CTR.
FOR GLOBAL DEV. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.cgdev.org/blog/surprising-and-sensible-remarks-unileverceo-paul-polman.
64
See Coca-Cola – sharing skills, saving lives: Leveraging business innovations to improve delivery
of lifesaving drugs, THE GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/partners/privatesector/cocacola/
(last visited May 16, 2015).
65
See Press Release, The Global Fund, Coca-cola and the Global Fund Announce Partnership to
Help
Bring
Critical
Medicines
to
Remote Regions
(Sept. 25, 2012), available
at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/mediacenter/newsreleases/2012-09-25_Coca-cola_and_the_Global_Fund
_Announce_Partnership_to_Help_Bring_Critical_Medicines_to_Remote_Regions/.
66
See Press Release, Clinton Foundation, Clinton Foundation and Pepsico Launch Strategic
Partnership to Spur Social and Economic Development in Emerging Markets (May 22, 2014), available at
https://www.clintonfoundation.org/press-releases/clinton-foundation-and-pepsico-launch-strategic-partners
hip-spur-social-and-economic.
67
See Meet our Partners, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/partners/privatesector/meet-our-partners (last visited May 16, 2015).
68
See INTERNATIONAL FOOD & BEVERAGE ALLIANCE, https://ifballiance.org/ (last visited May 16,
2015).
69
See HEALTHY WEIGHT COMMITMENT FOUNDATION, http://www.healthyweightcommit.org/ (last
visited May 16, 2015).
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unhealthy food marketing to children under the age of twelve.70 Progress
has been mixed, in some cases and there remains a significant gap between
company pledges and current practices (e.g., food marketing). 71 Such
voluntary commitments at the global and national levels have also been
widely criticized as establishing weak or vague standards without strong
independent oversight, regulation, and evaluation.72
Despite industry claims of their positive contributions and the
recognized benefits of cooperation, such close involvement can bias
otherwise impartial ventures. Currently, private resources are flowing into
public health research and professional associations.73 Such contributions
have helped finance the endowments of large global health foundations in
the past.74 In addition, foreign direct investment by corporations amounted
to more than USD 470 billion in 2011, and is believed to be approaching
USD 1 trillion.75 This influx of private funds comes at an opportune time for
business when only about 3 percent of development assistance for health is
dedicated to NCDs.76 With limited public investment in NCD prevention
and control, the impact of private funding is even more influential.
According to David Stuckler, a professor of political economy and
sociology at University of Oxford, companies that produce SSBs are
employing similar tactics as the tobacco industry, in order to “divert[ ] the
agenda and bias[ ] the science.”77 For example, a 2013 systematic review
found that industry-funded studies examining the relationship between SSBs
and weight gain or obesity were “five times more likely to present a
70

See Our Commitments, INTERNATIONAL FOOD & BEVERAGE ALLIANCE, https://ifballiance.org/ourcommitments/ (last visited May 16, 2015).
71
See Corinna Hawkes & Jennifer L Harris, An analysis of the content of food industry pledges on
marketing to children, 14 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 1403 (2011).
72
See Michele Roberts et al., Compliance with children’s television food advertising regulations in
Australia, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 846 (2012); Corinna Hawkes, Self-regulation of food advertising: what it
can, could and cannot do to discourage unhealthy eating habits among children, 30 NUTRITION BULL. 374
(2005); Sharron Bowers et al., Does current industry self-regulation of food marketing in New Zealand
protect children from exposure to unhealthy food advertising?, CANCER SOC’Y OF NEW ZEALAND (2012),
http://www.otago.ac.nz/wellington/otago036971.pdf.
73
See David Stuckler et al., Global Health Philanthropy and Institutional Relationships: How
Should Conflicts of Interest Be Addressed?, 8 PLOS MED., e1001020, 2011.
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t-2015/1910242/242901/article.html.
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Rachel A. Nugent & Andrea B. Feigl, Where Have All The Donors Gone? Scarce Donor Funding
For Non-Communicable Diseases 16 (Ctr. for Global Development, Working Paper 228, 2010), available
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conclusion of no positive association.” 78 Private industry also influences
professional associations, some of which produce their own research and are
leading authorities in promulgating evidence-based public health guidelines.
For example, the American College of Sports Medicine has a stated mission
to “advance and integrate scientific research to provide educational and
practical applications of exercise science and sports medicine.”79 But one of
its prominent global health initiatives, Exercise is Medicine, includes CocaCola as one of its two sole funders. Similarly, the American Academy of
Family Practice received a large donation from Coca-Cola to support patient
education on obesity prevention. 80 In addition, former employees of
PepsiCo played prominent roles in workshops and reports produced by the
Institute of Medicine, including one’s focused on cardiovascular disease
prevention in developing countries, country-level decision making for
controlling NCDs, and PPPs for global health.81
The food and beverage industry’s involvement in global health may be
less overt, but still influential. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation the largest private foundation in the United States and is a
leading funder of global health initiatives with assets of almost USD 30
billion, has maintained significant ties to food and beverage companies and
the pharmaceutical industry for a number of years. 82 In 2012, the
Foundation held 9.4 million shares in McDonald’s stock (or about 5 percent
of its portfolio) and more than 15 million shares in Coca-Cola stock (over 7
percent of its portfolio).83 The Foundation’s largest holding is in Berkshire
Hathaway, which represents 49.75 percent of its portfolio, or USD 5.9
billion. Berkshire Hathaway, in turn, has its largest holding in The CocaCola Company, representing more than 20 percent of its portfolio, or roughly
USD 10 billion.84 In early 2015, the Gates Foundation announced the sale of
its stock holdings in both McDonald’s and Coca-Cola during the fourth

78
Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest and Reporting Bias Regarding the
Association between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review of Systematic
Reviews, 10 PLOS MED., e1001578, 2013, at 2.
79
About ACSM, AM. COLLEGE OF SPORTS MED., http://www.acsm.org/about-acsm/who-we-are (last
visited May 16, 2015).
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Howard Brody, Professional Medical Organizations and Commercial Conflicts of Interest:
Ethical Issues, 8 ANNALS OF FAMILY MED. 354, 354 (2010).
81
See, e.g., Directory: Committee Member – Dr. Derek Yach, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADEMIES, http://iom.edu/Global/Directory/Detail.aspx?id=0020019489 (last visited May 16, 2015).
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quarter of 2014, a combined 32.3 million shares valued at USD 1.9 billion.85
However, the Gates Foundation continues to hold investments in Berkshire
Hathaway.86
Although partnerships with food and beverage companies have
contributed positively to global development, their unchecked infiltration
into developing country markets can have negative consequences for public
health. The case of Brazil is a prime example. Several multinational food
and beverage companies, namely Nestle and Coca-Cola, have penetrated
even the most remote areas of the country, using door-to-door marketing
tactics, and targeting low-income consumers.87 In a globalized food system
and increased urbanization, developing countries and emerging economies
are experiencing an influx of SSBs that are displacing traditional diets and
contributing to obesity and NCDs, such as cardiovascular disease and type 2
diabetes.88
III.

CURRENT UN APPROACHES TO PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE PRIVATE
SECTOR

Calls for “multi-sectoral” or “multi-stakeholder” collaborations,
particularly to address global NCDs, are widespread among governments
and intergovernmental organizations, including UN, the WHO, PAHO, the
World Bank, and others.89 Currently, States are negotiating the post-2015
development agenda at the UN, where health, NCDs, and nutrition are likely
to feature prominently. 90 Partnerships continue to be a major discussion
topic and a key point of emphasis, raising questions about how they can be
effectively used to achieve goals in each thematic area of the proposed
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South: A View from Brazil, 9 PLoS Med., e1001252, 2012, at 3.
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Shetty, Nutrition Transition in India, 5 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 175 (2002).
89
Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, 2013-2020,
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SDGs being considered at the forthcoming UN General Assembly in
September 2015.91
Dialogue and policymaking on the WHO’s relationship with non-state
actors, including the food and beverage industry is playing out
simultaneously within several processes. One process is specifically relates
to global NCDs and the other relates to the WHO governance more broadly.
Pertaining to NCDs, the WHO is responsible for facilitating actions
identified by Member States in the Political Declaration of the 2011 United
Nations High Level Meeting on NCDs, including a new global NCD action
plan, and a new global coordinating mechanism that aims to “facilitate and
enhance…multi-stakeholder engagement and action across sectors.”92 The
Global Coordinating Mechanism (“GCM”) for NCDs is charged with
“facilitat[ing] engagement among Member States, United Nations funds,
programmes and agencies, and other international partners, and non-State
actors” to inform the WHO governing bodies.93 For the GCM, the WHO
defines non-State actors as “academia and relevant nongovernmental
organizations, as well as selected private sector entities, as appropriate,” but
only explicitly excludes the tobacco industry from consideration.
This inclusive approach slightly contrast with how the role of the food
and beverage industry is considered within broader the WHO reforms.
Member States at the May 2015 World Health Assembly will consider a new
“framework of engagement with non-State actors.”94 The outcomes of this
process are intended to produce clearer guidelines and procedures for how
the WHO will engage with the private sector, including food and beverage
companies. Based on views expressed by Member States regarding the
WHO’s proposed framework, some governments remain wary of direct
global alliance with the food and beverage industries, and view them in a
similar vein as the tobacco and firearms industries. Pertaining to entities
with which the WHO will not engage, the proposed framework says,
“although there is agreement that the WHO should not engage with the
tobacco and arms industries, this restriction, in the view of a number of
91
See General Assembly, The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and
protecting
the
planet,
U.N.
Doc.
A/69/700
(Dec.
4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E.
92
WHO Global Coordination Mechanism on the Prevention and Control of NCDs, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/nmh/ncd-coordination-mechanism/en/ (last visited May 16, 2015).
93
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Noncommunicable Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1 (2013), http://www.who.int/cardiovascular_diseases/
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Member States, should be extended to others, including notably the alcohol,
food and beverage industries.”95
However, to date normative guidelines and strategies produced by the
WHO have refrained from excluding the food and beverage industries from
active participation in NCD partnerships and initiatives. Instead, the Global
Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, the 2008-2013 Action Plan
for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable
Diseases, and the 2013-2020 Global Action Plan for the Prevention and
Control of Noncommunicable Diseases all advocate for partnerships and
cooperation with relevant private actors. In some of these documents, such
as the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, there is an
explicit commitment from the WHO to “hold discussions with the
transnational food industry and other parts of the private sector in support of
the aims of the Strategy, and of implementing the recommendations in
countries.”96 Elsewhere in the Global Strategy, the WHO contends that “the
private sector can be a significant player in promoting healthy diets.”97 The
new 2013-2020 Global Strategy on NCDs continues this emphasis on
partnerships, and a commitment from the WHO to “facilitate coordination,
collaboration and cooperation among the main stakeholders including . . .
the private sector.”98
As these processes unfold, the role of partnerships will likely remain
at the forefront. Past experiences interacting with the food and beverage
industry can help guide how the UN, the WHO, and other normative and
global health policy-making institutions should proceed as they consider the
role of PPPs within the SDGs. These experiences are discussed in the
following case studies.
IV.

CASE STUDIES OF BEVERAGE COMPANY INFLUENCE ON GLOBAL NCDS

The following two case studies examine tactics utilized by major
SSBs, especially Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, to directly influence global policy
discourse on NCDs. The first case study is the NCD Roundtable, a civil
society coalition that included NGOs, universities, think tanks, and private
sector as members. The second case study is the Pan American Forum for
Action on NCDs—a platform established by the Pan American Health
95
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Organization, the WHO’s regional office of the Americas. This case study
represents a more typical public-private partnership model with government,
NGO, academic, and private sector members. Each case study focuses
heavily on global NCD policy-making processes, including the 2011 UN
High Level Meeting on NCDs and the World Health Assembly. Despite
important differences the following examination of the tactics employed to
advance corporate interests in global health suggests the need for greater
care when considering the ethics and efficacy of future partnerships with the
SSB industry.
A.

The NCD Roundtable

Launched by the Global Health Council (“GHC”) in December 2010,
the NCD Roundtable (“NCDRT”) was founded as “a coalition of civil
society organizations, including NGOs, academia, research institutions and
the private sector, working to raise the profile of NCDs through policy
dialogue and engagement, partnership building, and grassroots
mobilization.” 99 When founded, the GHC was the largest membership
organization devoted to global health.100 GHCs initial motivation to launch
the NCDRT was based on member demands that the GHC organize its
membership to establish and stake policy positions on key issues relevant to
the High Level Meeting and World Health Organization deliberations on
NCDs.101
The NCDRT functioned similarly to GHC’s other issue-specific
roundtables. However, the private sector was not generally a major voice at
these other roundtables, except for pharmaceutical and medical technologies
companies that participated on a limited basis.102 In stark contrast, a number
of prospective private sector members of GHC appeared to join the
organization specifically to participate in the NCDRT. These companies,
which included PepsiCo and Coca-Cola, were not active in any other
roundtable convened by GHC. However, they were regular participants in
the NCDRT and were active in discussions about advocacy strategy and
policy recommendations. 103 Notably, some private sector organizations,
99
GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, LOCAL SOLUTIONS: MOBILIZING FOR NCDS. A
STATEMENT OF THE GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL NCD ROUNDTABLE (2011) [hereinafter MOBILIZING FOR
NCDS].
100
About Us, GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, http://globalhealth.org/about-us/mission-and-vision/ (last
visited May 16, 2015).
101
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102
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including food and beverage companies, even inquired about a separate
membership for just the NCDRT.104
The NCDRT’s institutional diversity was a unique characteristic of the
coalition that it openly marketed to outside stakeholders, including
governmental, inter-governmental, and private sector entities as well as
prospective new members. In essence, the “democratic” nature of the
coalition gave equal voice to all parties, including private sector food and
beverage industry members. 105 Each member had an opportunity to
participate in generating consensus policy recommendations. 106 In theory,
each member held an equal seat at the decision-making table of the coalition.
This type of co-mingling of stakeholders advantaged more powerful entities,
who could sway discussions simply by their mere presence.107
This inclusive approach to decision-making was particularly relevant
when developing policy recommendations. For example, a primary activity
of the NCDRT in preparation regional preparatory meetings convened by the
WHO and its regional offices was to develop a set of consensus policy
recommendations to use in advocacy targeting the US Government, the
WHO, and other decision-makers.108 The final document, entitled Global
Leadership, Local Solutions: Mobilizing for NCDs, stood as a “statement of
the Global Health Council.” 109 All of the eighty-plus organizations
participating in the NCDRT had the opportunity to contribute to the
document, and make recommendations on its contents, including Coca-Cola
and PepsiCo. This process, which was afforded a high degree of legitimacy
because it was led by and in the name of GHC, was an indirect way for
beverage companies to influence policy recommendations on global
NCDs.110 Global Leadership, Local Solutions, in turn, was used in meetings
with government officials who were directly involved in negotiating global
NCD policy, including the UN High Level Meeting’s Political
Declaration.111
At the center of these policy recommendations was an unambiguous
endorsement of “multi-sector partnerships,” or “whole-of-society”
approaches, including the private sector at national and international
104
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levels.112 These recommendations also failed to mention any public health
regulatory approaches to NCDs, despite evidence supporting the efficacy of
such approaches, 113 implying the need for voluntary commitments and
action. Indeed, an explicit call for partnership with the private sector,
including the food and beverage industries but excluding tobacco,
consistently ran through the events and documents produced by GHC
regarding global NCDs. 114 In addition, the recommendations take a
favorable position towards accepting and even promoting financing from
private sector sources, including major beverage corporations.115
Industry-sponsored GHC events on global NCDs during 2011 also
provided PepsiCo and Coca-Cola with both a façade of legitimacy as an
equal partner within the public health community, and significant access to
policy-makers who were directly involved with the proceedings of the UN
High Level Meeting. One event, held at the United Nations, was a “multistakeholder dialogue” around approaches to global NCDs. 116 As in the
process for developing the GHC policy positions on global NCDs, this event
GHC’s global health brand legitimized industry perspectives, and afforded
beverage industry representatives access to key players and decision-makers
on international NCD policy. The event was co-sponsored by PepsiCo,
along with two organizations in which food and beverage companies are
heavily involved - the World Economic Forum and UN Global Compact.117
In addition, representatives from PepsiCo and Coca-Cola occupied
prominent roles in the meeting’s agenda. Meeting participants included
representatives from various government embassies to the UN, as well as the
Ambassadors from Jamaica and Luxembourg, who at the time, served as cofacilitators of the UN High Level Meeting on NCDs.118 Industry influenced
the planning and execution of the event by sponsoring it. In turn, GHC
established PepsiCo and Coca-Cola as equal partners.
The High Level Meeting’s Political Declaration reflected the
heightened attention to multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder engagement and
112
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partnerships. The term multi-sectoral appears in the Political Declaration
fifteen times, and an entire section is devoted to “whole-of-government” and
“whole-of-society” actions, the latter implying partnerships with the food
and beverage industries. Again, this designation includes the food and
beverage industries, while Member States agreed that only the tobacco
industry has a “fundamental conflict of interest” with public health.
Beverage companies also took advantage of GHC’s intimate
relationship with the WHO and the UN to gain access to global policymaking deliberations and provide formal recommendations to influence
policy-making. As an organization in official relations with the WHO and as
an accredited member of the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations, GHC and its delegation participated at international meetings on
NCDs such as the World Health Assembly. UN High Level Meeting on
NCDs, and the Civil Society Consultation Hearing that preceded the High
Level Meeting. Although many of these meetings would not have otherwise
be open to the private sector, representatives from Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and
the International Food Information Council Foundation, 119 an industryfunded front group,120 all participated on GHC delegations to these meetings
in 2011 and in subsequent years.121 Given such access, these groups held
119

Industry front groups are a well-documented tactic by industry to dispute science and create doubt.
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influential side events at major UN meetings and provided formal
recommendations on global NCD policy.122
An important strategy to improve the standing of these companies
within global public health circles, as practiced by the tobacco industry, was
to hire prominent experts to increase company activity and image around the
UN High Level Meeting. In the case of PepsiCo, the company gave a
prominent role at the NCD Summit to Derek Yach, a former Executive
Director at the WHO that had been tapped by PepsiCo years earlier as the
Senior Vice President for Global Health and Agriculture Policy. 123 Yach’s
history with the WHO is important to note because of the agency’s central
role in global NCD policymaking and his connections with global health
policymakers within the WHO and countries around the world. While
Executive Director of NCDs at the WHO, Yach helped strengthen the
organization’s relationship with the food and beverage industry. 124 Notably,
during Yach’s tenure at PepsiCo, instead of carving a different path forward,
PepsiCo continued similar tactics to influence public policy and sway public
opinion. The company continued to emphasize self-regulation, its
participation in voluntary commitment organizations, and the positive
contributions it could make in public-private partnerships.125
There are a number of plausible reasons for the NCDRT’s approach to
private sector participation. While the exact reasons may never be known,
the timing of private sector organizations’ participation is critical. Their
122

Kimberly Reed, “Remember the People” in Communicating About Food, GLOBAL HEALTH
COUNCIL BLOG (May 19, 2011), http://www.globalhealth.org/remember-the-people-in-communicatingabout-food/.
123
International Health Policy Analyst Derek Yach Joins the Vitality Group, PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 23,
2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/international-health-policy-analyst-derek-yach-joins-thevitality-group-175389031.html.
124
In the early 2000’s, the WHO held private meetings with companies like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s,
Unilever and Nestle to consider their views while developing the 2002 World Health Report, focused on
promoting healthy living. Yach, who also served as chair of the WHO Reference Group, which advised on
the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, helped arrange ongoing consultations with the
food and beverage industries while developing the new global strategy. At the time, the WHO viewed the
food and beverage industry as fundamentally distinct from the tobacco industry, though the organization
also claimed SSBs contributed to obesity and declining health. Despite this stance, a number of media
reports at the same time documented evidence of industry influence and claimed the organization was
“infiltrated by [the] food industry…just as the tobacco industry did.” Speaking on behalf of the WHO,
Yach responded to the criticism, and said,
…food is not tobacco. The food and beverage industries are a part of the solution. They have an
important role to play in achieving the best possible global strategy. We have been arranging a
series of transparent discussions where all parties can discuss practical solutions for better diet,
which do not in any way compromise the interests of public health.
Statement, World Health Organization, WHO welcomes media focus on key global health issue of diet and
chronic diseases (Jan. 3 2003), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2003/statement1/en/.
125
See Derek Yach et al., The Role and Challenges of the Food Industry in Addressing Chronic
Diseases, 6 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1 (2010).

656

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 3

involvement in global NCD policy issues significantly increased around the
time of the UN High Level Meeting, which presented significant opportunity
for them to influence global policy that would affect their brand and
products. This strategic increase in “socially responsible” activities during
this time allowed PepsiCo and Coca-Cola to paint a public image of
themselves as responsible corporate citizens. These perceived positive
contributions to global NCD efforts helped overshadow any critique
associated with products they manufacture that might be detrimental to
health and contribute to the growing burden of NCDs. It also allowed these
organizations to directly influence the development of international policy.
Not long after the UN High Level Meeting, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo’s
participation in the NCDRT’s activities diminished, along with their
prominence in global NCD policy discussions. Neither company is currently
a member of the NCDRT, which continues to advocate on global NCD
policy with the US Government, the WHO and UN.126
B.

Pan American Forum for Action on NCDs

In 2009, the Pan American Health Organization (“PAHO”), a
specialized agency of the Organization of American States and the Americas
regional office of the WHO, partnered with the World Economic Forum to
jointly establish the PAHO Partners Forum, which later became the Pan
American Forum for Action on NCDs (“PAFNCD”), to provide a formal
mechanism for dialogue between PAHO and private actors to address
NCDs.127 PAFNCD is designed to serve as PAHO’s innovative approach to
harness business for public good. Similar to GHC’s NCDRT, the platform
was designed to take an “open” and inclusive approach, promoting “multistakeholder action” to implementing the PAHO Regional Strategy for the
Prevention and Control of NCDs.128 Though PAHO still retains the right to
deny membership to organizations it deems unsuitable partners, which
includes any organization with “ties to tobacco, alcohol, weapons, land
mines, or products deemed detrimental to public health,” the PAFNCD is
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still an open, multi-sectoral forum, allowing such corporations as Pfizer,
Medtronic and Coca-Cola to take “a lead role.”129
PAHO’s approach to engaging with the food and beverage industry
mirrors that of the WHO under the leadership of Gro Harlem Brundtland and
her Executive Director, Derek Yach.
These industries are viewed
unequivocally as partners and full stakeholders in NCD policymaking
without “products detrimental to public health,” despite significant research
demonstrating the detrimental impact of SSBs and the concrete evidence that
these industries have sought to thwart effective regulatory approaches,
nationally and internationally.130 Similar to GHC’s NCDRT, the PAFNCD
openly solicited the participation of the food and beverage industry. In a
letter addressed to prospective members, Irene Klinger, head of the
PAFNCD, wrote:
All stakeholders have a role to play to combat the epidemic of
NCDs in the Americas. PAFNCD brings together all actors with
complementary roles & skills to dialogue and catalyze
innovative ways to jointly implement the strategic priority
initiatives of the Regional Strategy, together with the 38 PAHO
Members States, civil society organizations, private sector
companies and academia.131
As a welcomed partner, participant, and financer of the PAFNCD, the
food and beverage industry has been afforded opportunities to influence
PAHO’s policy discourse on NCDs both before and after the UN High Level
Meeting on NCDs. According to PAHO, the Organization’s “dialogue with
partners,” including through the PAFNCD, was a key step in its preparatory
process to “influence the discussion for the UN Summit [on NCDs] and
contribute [to the] Outcome document.”132 In addition, the implementation
of the PAFNCD as a proof of concept for developing cross-sector
129
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partnerships, including with food and beverage companies, was “presented
to the UN Secretary General in September 2012 as an approach for
developing global partnerships,” according to James Hospedales, PAHO’s
NCD technical lead and coordinator at the time.133
As such, PAHO was calling upon the food and beverage industry to
help it refine this proof of concept (i.e. a multi-stakeholder platform to
address NCDs), which would, in turn, be presented to the UN as an NCD
policy alternative. But the food and beverage industry’s influence in the
PAFNCD stemmed beyond its role as a participant. It was a significant
financer and advisor for the PAFNCD and its eight strategic initiatives.134 A
special report published by Reuters in 2012 highlighted a number of large
industry donations to PAHO to support the work of the PAFNCD, including
USD 50,000 from Coca-Cola, USD 150,000 from Nestle, and USD 150,000
from Unilever. Unilever and Coca-Cola were both heavily involved in
advisory capacities for the PAFNCD and its initiatives. Therefore, the
question arose as to whether industry members were simply “pay[ing] for [a]
seat at [the] health-policy table.” 135 Such contributions from industry
directly to PAHO were also unprecedented. The Reuters article went on to
state, “ . . . the Pan American Health Organization, not only is relying on the
food and beverage industry for advice on how to fight obesity. For the first
time in its 110-year history, it has taken hundreds of thousands of dollars in
money from the industry.” The fact that a significant amount of PAFNCD
funding coming from industry raises questions about PAHO’s ability to
independently determine NCD policy and its implementation.
As a member of the PAFNCD’s Advisory Steering Group (“ASG”),
IFBA was appointed to the role by the Director of PAHO, and instructed to
“advise [the PAHO] technical secretariat on the PAF-NCD from initial kickoff to full operationalization, and to monitor its implementation and results.”
This advice focuses on strategy, structure, resource mobilization,
membership, and communications.
Beyond the ASG, food and beverage industry interests reach into
specific PAFNCD initiatives. One such example is the PAFNCD’s dietary
salt reduction initiative, SaltSmart Consortium. The SaltSmart Consortium
133
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was prioritized because of the potential public health impact in the region,
and previous successful public-private partnerships that actively engaged
food producers to reformulate the salt content of their products. 136 Like the
PAFNCD Advisory Steering Group, the SaltSmart Consortium includes
industry representatives in its advisory group. Specifically, two food
industry representatives, one from Unilever and the other from Kraft Foods
(now Mondolez International) were included in the initiative’s eight-person
advisory group. As members of the SaltSmart Consortium’s advisory group,
food industry interests could be brought to bear in the initiative’s strategy,
focus and direction. 137 Through its active participation and financial
contributions to the SaltSmart Consortium, the food and beverage industry
was able to influence PAHO’s NCD prevention policy implementation.
From the PAFNCD’s inception, PAHO has contended that it would
serve as a vehicle for policy implementation, not a platform for policy
formulation. 138 However, some question whether PAHO’s interest in
collaborating with industry was unbiased, or if food and beverage companies
bought its way to engaging with national governments from the region. The
PAFNCD included representatives from national governments from the
region, affording the food and beverage industry regular access to the same
government officials who would in turn participate in NCD policymaking
within PAHO through the Pan American Sanitary Conference, PAHO’s
governing body meeting.139 In 2012, while PAHO increased its engagement
with industry through the PAFNCD, it guided a new regional Plan of Action
for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases in the
Americas, 2013-2019. Adopted at the 28th Pan American Sanitary
Conference, the Plan of Action encourages governments to pursue multisectoral partnerships to prevent and control NCDs, and recommends
codification of these approaches as part of national NCD plans. 140 This
includes pursuing collaborations and partnerships with the private sector. As
part of the regional Plan of Action, PAHO plans to actively monitor country
progress by assessing the “number of countries implementing a national
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multi-sectoral plan.”141 Through these actions, PAHO has taken the concept
of voluntary multi-sectoral action, which started with the PAFNCD, and
created a mandate for countries to follow this approach.142
Following this Reuters story exposing the influence of food and
beverage companies within PAHO, the WHO quickly clarified its
relationship with the private sector. The WHO Director-General Margaret
Chan stated that “when the WHO works with the private sector, the
Organization takes all possible measures to ensure its work to develop policy
and guidelines is protected from industry influence.” 143 Such protection
includes prohibiting funds “from enterprises that have a direct commercial
interest in the outcome of the project toward which they would be
contributing.”144 The statement continued: “the WHO Global Strategy on
Diet, Physical Activity and Health commits WHO to hold discussions with
the private sector, but the Organization will not take money from private
companies active in food and beverage production for work on NCD
prevention and control as implied by the media articles.” PAHO, as a WHO
Regional Office, would be in violation of the WHO policy by accepting
funds from the food and beverage industry to support NCD prevention and
control initiatives. However, PAHO is unique among the WHO regional
offices in that it wears two organizational hats, the WHO Regional Office for
the Americas (“AMRO”) and the specialized health agency of the
Organization of the American States (“PAHO”). Chan points out, “In some
areas the two entities may have variations in policy,”145 thereby attempting
to disassociate the WHO from PAHO’s decision to accept food and beverage
industry funding.
PAHO’s acceptance of food and beverage industry funding set off a
number of negative reactions within the global public health community,
particularly among those in the nutrition community. Public health advocates
started petitions to PAHO. 146 For example, the International Lactation
Consultant Association (“ILCA”) issued a statement and filed a formal
141
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complaint with PAHO citing PAHO’s acceptance of funding from Nestle,
whom ILCA argued, “market[s] products detrimental to health” and is not
“meeting their obligations under the International Code [of Marketing of
Breast-milk Substitutes].”147 The World Public Health Nutrition Association
also sent an open letter to PAHO in February 2013, following the election of
PAHO new director Dr. Carissa Etienne, stating, “the fact that PAHO
received money from The Coca-Cola Company and other food and beverage
corporations has damaged its reputation as the leading UN organization
concerned with nutrition and public health in our Hemisphere.” The letter,
signed by leading public health and nutrition experts including Marion
Nestle, Barry Popkin, and Walter Willett, called on Dr. Etienne to
“reconsider recent steps that have moved PAHO away from the path of
promoting better nutrition and health” by engaging with “multinational
corporations whose interests are in conflict with those of public health.”148
Responding to the pressure from the public health community, PAHO
took several steps which altered the nature of the organization’s engagement
with the food and beverage industry. First, Dr. Carissa Ettiene, assumed the
position at a time when civil society was discontent with the Organization
and calling for significant changes with its relationships with food and
beverage companies. Second, PAHO subsequently shifted fiduciary control
of the PAFNCD’s initiatives to the PAHO Foundation—formerly the Pan
American Health and Education Foundation—which is a 501(c)(3)
charitable arm of PAHO.149 Third, the PAFNCD currently assumes a much
less prominent role in PAHO’s NCD programming, in part because key staff
that championed and implemented the initiative are no longer with PAHO.
These staff include the PAFNCD’s director, PAHO’s NCD coordinator, who
was also the visionary behind the PAFNCD, and PAHO’s deputy director
who led partnerships and external relations for the organization. The
PAFNCD website is still active; however its last news release was from June
14, 2013.150

147
Elizabeth Brooks, Statement from the ILCA Board on PAHO and WHO Acceptance of Industry
Fund, 29 J. HUM. LACTATION 289, 289-90 (2013).
148
Open Letter to New UN Agency Chief: No More Deals with Nestle Please, WORLD PUB. HEALTH
NUTRITION ASSOC. (March 2013), http://www.wphna.org/htdocs/2013_mar_hp1_paho.htm.
149
About PAHO Foundation, PAHO FOUNDATION, http://www.pahofoundation.org/en/aboutus.html
(last visited May 16, 2015).
150
SaltSmart Consortium Endorses Plan to Halve Dietary Salt Consumption in the Americas by
2020, PAHO/WHO (June 14, 2013), http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=8801%3Asaltsmart-consortium-endorses-plan-to-halve-dietary-consumption-in-the-americas-by2020-&catid=740%3Anews-press-releases&Itemid=1926&lang=en.

662

V.

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 3

DISCUSSION

The NCDRT and PAFNCD both provide valuable lessons that
governments, international organizations and other stakeholders to consider
when formulating NCD policies and partnerships. Engagement with industry
is inevitable and in fact is already occurring. Momentum towards this
approach has been building for a number of years. 151 States have the
sovereign right to work with the private sector when developing global
health strategies, including the right to involve industry representatives on
state delegations to international meetings. Many contend that private sector
participation allows for rational decision-making. Private businesses are
regulated entities, and therefore, have a right to be heard and participate.
Informed industry opinions can, in some cases, help shape cogent policy.
However, given the increased involvement of the private sector in
NCD policy-making, public health organizations should remain wary of
companies’ conflicting interests. In addition to the cases discussed
previously, the UN Global Compact, NCDnet, a collaborate arrangement
between UN agencies and non-state actors, and the Moscow Global Forum,
held in April 2011 prior to the UN High Level Meeting are all examples of
the UN system directly engaging with industry around NCDs. Some have
argued this engagement led to favorable outcomes for industry in the UN
High Level Meeting’s Political Declaration.152 Food companies may play a
role in addressing NCDs, and in some cases, business interests may align
with public health. However, this engagement shouldn’t be accidental or
assumed. Business interests may align with public health in some instances,
but the fundamental motivations and interests of the private sector and
public health differ. A Corporations’ primary duty is to maximize profit for
shareholders, not the health of consumers. 153 These profit-maximization
motivations will always dominate the actions of the private sector. As such,
public health organizations should remain vigilant when interacting with
industry, particularly with companies whose products are known to
contribute to negative health outcomes, such as SSBs.
Therefore, the most important question is how to structure this
engagement to ensure it advances public health in a transparent, accountable
manner. Without the necessary controls, industry’s involvement in
international organizations and policy dialogue at the WHO and the UN can
151
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inhibit progress. When PPPs involve the food and beverage industry, their
efficacy is debatable.
As a result of the limited outcome evidence to support PPPs with food
and beverage companies, the cases of the NCDRT and PAFNCD are
concerning for the integrity of future global health and NCD policy-making
and partnerships. The case studies discussed above highlight three themes
relating to how SSB companies engage on global NCDs: A) resource
constraints and public-private partnerships, B) policy incoherence, and C)
insufficient accountability. Increasing fiscal constraints on public sector
funding has led to international development and global health communities
to pursuing alternative financing mechanisms, presenting an opportunity for
greater industry involvement. This increased willingness of governments,
international organizations, and NGOs to pursue collaborations with industry
deviates, at times, from existing policies or approaches, leading to policy
incoherence.
Further, as PPPs have emerged to fill resource and
programmatic voids within global health, there are insufficient controls to
require companies to transparently disclose interests, prevent conflicts of
interest, and ensure sufficient accountability. Though specific to NCDs,
these lessons can help inform future partnership development within the
broader global health and international development communities. In
particular, strong consideration should be taken as stakeholders continue to
debate the evolving international development architecture and the post2015 agenda.
A.

Resource Constraints and the Rise of Public–Private Partnerships

Ongoing resource constraints in international development and global
health have forced governments to increasingly pursue alternative financing
and program implementation arrangements through PPPs.154 This resource
gap is most apparent in global NCD financing. A substantial resource gap
exists between the burden of disease from NCDs and their commensurate
resources.155 This gap exists between donors and middle- and low-income
country national budgets. 156 Less than 5 percent of official development
assistance for health is for global NCDs. 157 In the case of the NCD
154
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Roundtable and PAFNCD, both were unfunded mandates at their inception.
GHC’s membership overwhelmingly favored (and urged) the organization’s
involvement and leadership of NCDs but it lacked any dedicated resources
for the program area. The PAFNCD has similarly struggled to acquire
dedicated resources internally, which likely influenced PAHO’s decision to
seek outside funding from food and beverage companies.
As evaluations of global PPPs have shown, they are effective in
mobilizing resources, a potential benefit in both cases of the NCDRT and
PAFNCD. At the time GHC launched the NCDRT, the organization relied
on two primary funding streams: membership dues and a large grant from
the Gates Foundation. Neither proved sustainable and GHC announced it
would close operations the following year. 158 The organization faced a
challenging financial situation when embarking upon its NCD work, and the
appeal of funding from the private sector provided a strong incentive to
include them in a significant way.
Beyond PAHO, the WHO has faced chronic resource constraints over
the past several decades, and its reliance on extra-budgetary contributions
has skewed its priorities. Roughly 80 percent of the WHO’s funding comes
from extra-budgetary funds from States and private sources which
significantly influence the WHO’s capacity to focus on particular health
issues.
For example, the majority of the WHO’s extra-budgetary
contributions are earmarked for infectious disease programs, despite NCDs
accounting for more than 60 percent of all deaths worldwide and injuries
accounting for some 17 percent of global disease burden. 159 Previous
research on the topic has found that over 90 percent of the WHO’s extrabudgetary funds were earmarked for diseases that accounted for less than 10
percent of global mortality.160
At the country level, national governments in some low- and middleincome countries have identified financial constraints as one of the principle
reasons for limited progress on NCD prevention and control.161 A common
justification for PPPs is to overcome these resource constraints. 162 Indeed,
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evaluations of PPPs typically focus on resource-sharing objectives, and
generally show positive results from a resource mobilization perspective.163
The goal of many PPPs is to mobilize resources that enable the execution of
public programs. However, effectiveness measures are often overlooked or
de-emphasized, in part due to ambiguous objectives. Such objectives often
point to “increased cooperation” or “increased collaboration among
stakeholders” as desired outcomes. These process-oriented, short-term aims
often substitute for outcome-focused, long-term objectives, which represent
a better measure of the PPP’s effectiveness.
B.

Policy Incoherence

This new era of collaboration and partnerships with industry deviates
from previously-held positions that viewed industry engagement more
critically.
This shift results in policy incoherence between global
governance and NCD policy priorities. Prior research in tobacco control
found that policy incoherence occurs when there are inconsistencies between
different policies, thus resulting in their mutual impairment.164 In the case of
tobacco, the WHO facilitated the FCTC to regulate certain transnational
corporations seen as fundamentally detrimental to health. But at the same
time, the WHO increased its support for and involvement in collaborations
and partnerships with the private sector. Widespread participation, including
engagement with the food, beverage, and alcohol industries, became a tenant
of good governance with the WHO and other international organizations.
With this shift away from industry skepticism, regulatory approaches
are being replaced with industry self-regulation and increased opportunities
for “multi-stakeholder” engagement. In spite of widespread recognition of
the FCTC’s success as a global governance model tool, many see it as
unique to tobacco with little or no useful application for other NCD risk
factors, such as unhealthy eating and excessive alcohol consumption.
Indeed, many global health thought-leaders have called for the active
inclusion of “the private sector, particularly the food and beverage
industries,” stating it is “extremely important to finding durable solutions”
related to NCD prevention.165 This view persists despite calls from many
public health groups for stronger regulation of the food, beverage, and
alcohol industries. Some view the FCTC as a model legal instrument that
163
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could be applied to unhealthy food and beverage product, such as through a
Framework Convention on Obesity. Though this type of binding treaty is
highly unlikely, governments could consider alternative regulatory
approaches, such as an International Code of Practice on the Marketing of
SSBs to Children. Such a measure may help address one area of coercive
tactics employed by the food and beverage industry that persists despite selfregulation.166
Further, the WHO continues to urge national governments to pursue
partnerships with the private sector to mobilize resources, strengthen
capacity, and enhance collaboration to address NCDs.167 At the same, the
WHO stresses the need for “robust governance mechanisms to safeguard
public health from conflicts of interest.” 168 Indeed, the WHO DirectorGeneral Margaret Chan has stated that food and beverage companies
“protect themselves by using the same tactics” as Big Tobacco.169 Chan has
also suggested that food and beverage companies are the “opposition,” and
that “when industry is involved in policy-making, rest assured that the most
effective control measures will be downplayed or left out entirely.”170
The WHO has also strengthened its recommendations on sugar intake,
despite pushback from industry. On March 4, 2015, the WHO released new
sugar intake guidelines for adults and children, advising that it be reduced to
less than 10 percent of total energy intake. The guidelines also conditionally
recommend individuals to reduce intake to less than 5 percent of total energy
intake.171 In response, the International Council of Beverage Associations,
which includes Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, released a statement opposing the
measure, suggesting that WHO’s recommendation “does not reflect
scientific agreement on the totality of evidence.”172
While the WHO’s new guidelines on sugar intake suggest a more
aggressive approach to combating the pervasiveness of sugar in high-income
166
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and increasingly middle- and low-income countries, its recommendations on
how to achieve these changes (e.g., through PPPs) is questionable. Previous
assertions by Chan on the adversarial nature of food and beverage
companies seem contrary to the WHO’s activities of engaging with and
promoting partnerships with these industries. Such partnership approaches
are also contrary to existing research on PPPs generally, and those
specifically involving the food and beverage industry.
C.

Insufficient Accountability

As the global health landscape becomes increasingly complex and
resources continue to flow into PPPs, evaluation and accountability will be
critical. Although PPPs are a popular strategy to address global health
challenges, they often lack sufficient evaluation protocols to assess their
effectiveness. 173 In their review of independent evaluations of existing
global health PPPs, Buse and Tanaka found that there is a “relatively small
number of independent GHP [global health partnership] evaluations publicly
available, however, reflects the generally inadequate commitment of global
health programmes, including partnerships, to evaluation.” 174 A separate
review of PPPs in developing countries commissioned by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands details the shortcomings of existing PPP
evaluations, which often lack an appropriate reference point for comparison
prior to the PPP and are unclear whether positive effects directly result from
the PPP or some other factor. 175 Some contend that PPPs “are basically
public relations and market expansion gambits for the private sector.”176
The limited commitment to evaluations of PPPs in global health
presents a key question of accountability, especially when these partnerships
include contentious stakeholders, such as the food and beverage industry.
Currently, few accountability mechanisms exist to assess the nature of the
food and beverage industry’s interaction with the public sector and civil
society in current PPPs; concrete mechanisms for monitoring and review
should be an essential component of future partnerships. Both the NCDRT
and PAFNCD implemented few accountability measures, and the PAHO
altered its means for engaging with the food and beverage industry only after
173
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significant negative media exposure. Many national governments lack an
independent accountability mechanism to assess collaborations and
partnerships with industry. Meanwhile, private resources have become a
significant funding stream in global health, yet the extent of these resources
and the relationships between actors are not well understood. 177
Transparency and accountability have also been major concerns at the WHO,
in part due to the WHO not having a third-party review process for the
partnerships it enters. In short, the WHO lacks an independent means of
protecting against conflicts of interest.
In the area of PPPs to address NCDs, some have called for the
establishment or improvement of monitoring systems of private sector
policies and practices, especially those related to the food and beverage
industry. Such systems must be independent and empowered with
enforcement authority and capabilities, as The Lancet NCD Action Group
has proposed.178 In a 2015 Lancet article, Swinburn and colleagues outlined
an accountability framework to promote healthy food environments, which
also included enforcement mechanisms for both governments and the private
sector, such as legal, quasi-regulatory, market-based, and other strategies.179
Similarly, the International Network for Food and Obesity/NCD Research,
Monitoring and Action Support (“INFORMAS”) has created a monitoring
approach of private sector policies and practices that influence food
environments.180 Although many of the monitoring measures of food and
beverage industry policies and practices in global NCD prevention and
control are still being developed, they emphasize the need for greater
transparency and independent monitoring.
Many public health experts believe it is not possible to construct
effective public health partnerships with food and beverage companies. A
Lancet-sponsored group of independent experts in a 2013 review of tobacco,
alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drink industries concluded that
“despite the common reliance on industry self-regulation and public-private
partnerships to improve public health, there is no evidence to support their
effectiveness or safety.”181 The article unequivocally stated that “unhealthy
177
178
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commodity industries should have no role in the formation of national or
international policy for non-communicable disease policy.” Others have
gone further to suggest governments, international organizations, and other
stakeholders “reject partnership with food and alcohol industries as
inappropriate and voluntary regulation as inadequate given the global
challenge of obesity and alcohol related harms.”182
VI.

CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA

This discussion has important implications for the UN Sustainable
Development Goals that aim to achieve “improved nutrition”183 and “ensure
healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.”184 Realizing these
goals requires governments, the public health community, civil society, and
other stakeholders carefully scrutinize and define terms of engagement with
the food and beverage industry to ensure public health remains the highest
priority. The global health community must ask questions of the private
sector and explicitly define its role; its full participation and cooperation in
global health policy decision-making should not be assumed. Food and
beverage companies may very well be able to play a role, but governments
should not conflate setting public health objectives through policy with
strategies to achieve them.185
Such questions are not currently at the forefront of policy discourse on
global NCDs. Other important questions have risen to the top of the
agenda,186 while a largely undefined “multi-stakeholder” or “multi-sectoral”
approach remains a prevailing assumption, such as in proposed SDG 17,
which calls for “multi-stakeholder partnerships . . . to support the
achievement of sustainable development goals” and “encourage[s] . . .
public-private . . . partnerships.” 187 As researchers have found in other
sectors, such as agriculture, PPPs may serve a valuable purpose, but they
“are not automatically the right choice to solve every challenge in
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agriculture.”188 After all, PPPs remain a relatively new form of development
cooperation. As Peter Drucker, an influential philosopher of the modern
business corporation, said, “erroneous assumptions can be disastrous.” A
solution is only as effective as its underlying assumptions. When
assumptions are faulty, solution strategies are misguided and ultimately fail.
As a 2012 PLoS Medicine editorial argued, “the food industry is ripe
for scrutiny.”189 Its attempts to gain legitimacy within global health resemble
many of the same tactics previously used by the tobacco industry. Food and
beverage companies are actively pursuing opportunities to influence the
policy debate and policy-making on global NCDs, as the NCDRT and
PAFNCD cases demonstrate. Thus, as the WHO continues to pursue and
promote an inclusive, multi-sectoral approach to addressing NCDs, it should
consider the food and beverage industry’s history as an effective partner.
Ultimately, is the industry motivated to protect public health, or is their
involvement in global NCDs a strategic decision based on business
interests? As Beaglehole and colleagues state, “market forces contribute to
the rise of NCDs . . . from the successful marketing of unhealthy products;
this outcome provides strong justification for government intervention
through regulatory and legislative responses.”190
VII. CONCLUSION
PPPs have become an important strategy to address complex global
health challenges. As the global burden of NCDs and obesity expands,
governments, international organizations, and civil society will continue to
explore opportunities to collaborate with the private sector, including in
pursuit of achieving the forthcoming SDGs. In many cases, the private
sector, including the food and beverage industry, has a “seat at the table.”
Like tobacco companies, however, food and beverage companies are
employing similar tactics as tobacco companies to sway public sentiment
and influence the outcome of policy debates. While the debate continues
regarding the specific mechanisms required to advance global NCD policy,
this article offers two cautionary case studies supporting the need for
sufficient monitoring and accountability with whatever mechanism is
pursued. As with tobacco companies, some food and beverage companies
188
Marco Ferroni & Paul Castle, Public-Private Partnerships and Sustainable Agriculture
Development, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 1064, 1071 (2011).
189
See The PLoS Medicine Editors, PLoS Medicine Series on Big Food: the Food Industry is Ripe for
Scrutiny, 9 PLOS MED. 1 (2012).
190
Beaglehole et al., supra note 186, at 452.

JUNE 2015

TAKE ME TO YOUR LITER

671

manufacture products that are detrimental to health, such as SSBs.
Consumption of these unhealthy products is increasing in many low- and
middle-income countries and sometimes replacing native foods. The
constructive participation of the companies that produce these products
should not be assumed.

